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In studies of war it is important to observe that the processes leading to so frequent an event
as conflict are not necessarily those that lead to so infrequent an event as war. Also, many
models fail to recognize that a phenomenon irregularly distributed in time and space, such
as war, cannot be explained on the basis of relatively invariant phenomena. Much research
on periodicity in the occurrence of war has yielded little result, suggesting that the direction
should now be to focus on such variables as diffusion and contagion. Structural variables, such
as bipolarity, show contradictory results with some clear inter-century differences. Bipolarity,
some results suggest, might have different effects on different social entities. A considerable
number of studies analysing dyadic variables show a clear connection between equal
capabilities among contending nations and escalation of conflict into war. Finally, research
into national attributes often points to strength and geographical location as important
variables. In general, the article concludes, there is room for modest optimism, as research
into the question of war is no longer moving in non-cumulative circles. Systematic research
is producing results and there is even a discernible tendency of convergence, in spite of a
great diversity in theoretical orientations.
In the early 1930s, when Quincy Wright in
America and Lewis Richardson in England
began their respective investigations into the
causes of war, they were not only unaware of
one another’s work; they were, of necessity,
equally unaware of the radical change that
their studies would produce in the field of
war and peace research. With perhaps the
exception of Jean de Bloch - whose Future
of War (1899) sought all too successfully to
predict what warfare would look like on the
basis of a systematic examination of previous
wars - and Pitirim Sorokin (1937)-whose
focus was on the relationship between long
cycles in cultural patterns and fluctuations in
war and revolution over several thousand
years - Wright (1942) and Richardson
(1941 and 1960a, b) mark the first traceable
efforts to bring scientific method to bear on
international conflict. While physical phe-
nomena had been studied in an essentially
scientific fashion for several centuries, and
biological phenomena for nearly a century,
social phenomena had remained largely the
domain of theological speculation, moral
imperative, and conventional folklore. But
even as economics and sociology began to
emerge as systematic sciences, followed in
due course by the study of national political
systems, international politics remained one
of the most backward of disciplines.
This state of affairs was, and often still is,
explained in terms of the intractability of the
material; not only does much of the behavior
occur in secret, but the material, structural,
and cultural conditions associated with the
international system are allegedly too spread
out in time and in space to permit direct ob-
servation. But that explanation is incomplete.
Political elites, it can be assumed, preferred
things this way, partly because it made
diplomatic bargaining easier and partly be-
cause political power brokers have typically
shown an almost visceral reluctance to
operate in the open. But if any event dramat-
ically exposed the incompetence of these
elites and the dangers of their secret diplo-
macy, it was World War I. While the most
* I am indebted to Michael Champion, Peter
Wallensteen, and Klaus Jiirgen Gantzel for assist-
ance in preparing this essay, and to The National
Science Foundation for support of much of the
research reported here. An abridged version will
appear in the Annasal Review of Sociology.
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visible (and audible) result of this exposure
was the Wilsonian call for ’open covenants,
openly arrived at’, another message was
received by Wright and Richardson.
As I interpret their prefatory remarks,
each had begun to appreciate that another
reason for secrecy was that the decision
makers often did not ’know what they were
doing’; that is, even after lengthy domestic
debate over foreign or military policy, the
elites made recurrently erroneous predictions
as to the consequences of their actions.
Further, these two scholars arrived at a judg-
ment that was not only generous, but prob-
ably correct: that the problem lay not so
much with the stupidity or ambition of the
foreign policy elites, but more with their
ignorance. In addition, they observed that
this ignorance was not peculiar to the practi-
tioners alone; the scholarly community was
hardly better off.
Having arrived at these general conclu-
sions, it was natural that they would then
have some caustic observations on the ab-
sence of evidence, and the heavy reliance on
’brilliant, witty political discussion’ (Richard-
son, 1960a, p. v.). This British meteorologist
and pacifist also noted that ’many of those
who are considered to be experts on foreign
affairs do not base their opinions on histor-
ical facts, but on some sort of instinctive
reasoning’. But, as the subsequent research
of each makes clear, they saw the need for
something more than historical facts, as
gathered and interpreted by the standard
diplomatic historian or political analyst. If
the behavior of governments in the inter-
national setting was to become less destruc-
tive, the knowledge base from which they
worked would have to be greatly improved.
That is, if decision makers could more ac-
curately predict - on the basis of historically
observed regularities and theoretical infer-
ences therefrom-the consequences of their
decisions, there might be a decline in the fre-
quency and magnitude of war. Even if that
knowledge base served only to help chal-
lenge and question the assumptions behind
our decisions, the error rate might be re-
duced. Of course, while the acquisition and
codification of such knowledge would be
necessary, neither Wright nor Richardson
thought that it would be sufficient; decision
makers and attentive publics would also
have to be able and willing to understand,
evaluate, and apply that knowledge.
1. Typologies and taxonomies
Given, then, the need for a more solid knowl-
edge base in the emerging inter-disciplinary
field of war/peace studies, where do we
stand now? What kinds of knowledge have
we acquired and how adequately has it been
codified into theoretically coherent form?
What are the dominant orientations, and
what are the more promising of these? In
order to address these questions, we need
some sort of organizing framework, within
which we can differentiate the several the-
oretical orientations as well as summarize
our knowledge to date. The variety of frame-
works is, of course, quite large, and people
gravitate to one or another of them for all
sorts of reasons, scientific or otherwise:
nationality, social class, age, gender, educa-
tion, personality, academic identity, founda-
tion and governmental fashions, and even
(!) on the basis of prior research findings.
1.1 A familiar typology
One of the more familiar ways of classifying
- and often, selecting from among - the
possible approaches, is to divide them into
the standard categories of technological,
economic, geographic, political, demo-
graphic, ideological, psychological, etc. As
suggested, the advocates of any of these ap-
proaches often arrive at their position as a
result of disciplinary affiliation, reflecting the
oft-implicit premise that the academic disci-
pline that one selects reflects one’s ’belief’
that its major explanatory variables will ac-
count for virtually all sorts of social out-
comes. Choosing such a typology and one
of its approaches may, however, reflect
nothing more than the conviction that one
studies best those phenomena that one knows
best, and that such partial models and their
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findings must eventually be integrated into
those generated within the other social
sciences.
But regardless of the motives and assump-
tions, we usually end up with a typology that
helps to perpetuate and legitimize these
parochial orientations and to encourage the
appearance, disappearance, and reappear-
ance of those ’theories’ that are all too typ-
ical of the no-growth, non-cumulative disci-
plines. Thus we find heavy, if not sole reli-
ance on such factors as power discrepancies
(Blainey, 1973), surplus capital (Lenin,
1939), business cycles (Secerov,1919), demo-
graphic pressures (Organski, 1968), resource
needs (Choucri & North, 1975), elite person-
alities (Stoessinger, 1978), national moods
(Klingberg, 1952; McCIelland, 1961), mis-
perceptions (White, 1968), and so forth.
These at least have the virtue of resting upon
variables that show some variation across
time and place. But other alleged models of
a single-variable sort fail to even recognize
that a phenomenon as irregularly (and in-
frequently) distributed across time and space
as war cannot be explained on the basis of
relatively invariant phenomena. Thus, it is
difficult to take seriously such putative ex-
planations as the human drive for power
(Morgenthau, 1948) or territory (Ardrey,
1966), the instinct of aggressiveness (Lorenz,
1967), or libidinous drive (Fomari, 1974).
In addition to the fact that most of the
above orientations are rarely examined em-
pirically, are seldom related to other ex-
planations (Nelson & Olin, 1979; Silberner,
1946), ignore the multi-dimensional com-
plexities of the war-inducing process, show
insufficient variation in their ’explanatory
variables’, and are overly responsive to cur-
rent events, political pressures, and funding
agency fads, they usually suffer from another
fatal flaw. That is, they tend to overlook the
critical distinction between international con-
flict and international was. While conflicts
can arise out of an impressive range of social
incompatibilities, the processes that lead to
so frequent an event as conflicts are not
necessarily those that lead to so infrequent
an event as war. In a global system that is so
poorly integrated in the structural or cultural
sense, the relatively high frequency of serious
international conflicts and military confron-
tations (about 225 involving the major
powers alone since the Congress of Vienna)
need not surprise us, whereas the relatively
low frequency of war (fewer than 30 among
those same powers in those 160-odd years)
surely calls forth our curiosity.
Then there is the distinction between
necessary conditions and sufficient ones
(Deutsch & Senghaas, 1971). Many condi-
tions are necessary for modern war: the fact
that humans can behave aggressively and
that many of them do seek power or territory
under the proper stimuli; the availability of
transport and weapons technology; central-
ized decision authority; some sort of credible
justification, and so forth. While these may
well be certain necessary conditions, it is far
from clear that any single factor is sufficient
to carry a conflict across the threshold to
war.
We need, therefore, a typology that: a) re-
cognizes the qualitative differences among
competition, rivalry, and dispute on the one
hand, and sustained military combat on the
other, and that b) also recognizes the com-
plex interplay of necessary and/or sufficient
conditions reflecting a wide range of mate-
rial, structural, cultural, and behavioral
phenomena. In addition, it should aid in
integrating what we have discovered with
what we hope to discover, and if possible,
illuminate the research path that links the
two. A discrete check list will not suffice; an
integrated, but multitheoretical, framework
would seem to be essential. Let us turn, then,
to a scheme derived from the general systems
literature that might possibly help us to
organize what we know, and think we know,
and to help stimulate the most appropriate
next steps. This scheme has been laid out in
considerable detail elsewhere, along with an
elaborate epistemological rationale (Singer,
1971), but its bare outlines can be sum-
marized here.
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1.2 A general systems taxonomy
Since war is waged, contemplated, and con-
ducted by and on behalf of human beings
organized into a variety of social entities,
and is not conducted by relationships or roles
or system properties, it makes perfect sense
to build our taxonomy around those entities,
however transitory and/or amorphous they
may turn out to be. All sorts of social
groups can and do engage in sustained mil-
itary combat, but since our concern here is
with international war, we can confine our-
selves to the most relevant sub-national, na-
tional, and extra-national groups, ranging at
the sub-national level from the family and
primary work group up through all sorts of
secondary associations to political parties,
government agencies, legislatures, cabinets,
and armies.
When many such groups - at various
levels of aggregation, and covering various
functional sectors - are relatively unified
and coordinated within a national territory,
the resulting coalition may be called a na-
tional (or multi-national) state. The state or
nation is the dominant unit of the inter-
national system, but for centuries before the
emergence of that system, man was organized
in many other types of social organization;
and as other more effective groupings devel-
op and attract the loyalty of their members,
that pattern may be renewed, and it will be
increasingly appropriate to refer to the
global, rather than the international system.
In any event, the nation is the major partic-
ipant in international war, even though the
probability of any such war, and its outcome,
may well be influenced as much by the
various sub-national and extra-national
groupings with which the nation shares the
world stage. There is an almost limitless
range of levels of social aggregation at which
the causes of war question might be addres-
sed, but for the purposes of the discussion at
hand, we will address only four of them: the
international system (defined globally, re-
gionally, or functionally, depending on the
work being summarized); the inter-nation
dyad; the single nation; and the decision
making agency level. Social entities at any of
these levels may be thought of as systems,
embracing the attributes by which they are
described, as well as the behaviors and inter-
actions of the subsystems which make up the
larger system; hence we distinguish here be-
tween the ecological and behavioral variables
by which we seek to understand dynamic
social phenomena.
Social entities from the individual up to
the global system may be described in terms
of three sets of attributes; ranged in order of
tangibility and ease of operational measure-
ment, they are material, structural, and cul-
tural. Material attributes may be divided
into three subsets, of minimal relevance to
the individual human, but highly germane to
any other entity: geographic, demographic,
and technological. And by the structural at-
tributes of a social system we mean the insti-
tutional and organizational phenomena by
which economists, sociologists, and political
scientists usually describe it. Structural prop-
erties may be of a relatively formal nature,
embracing the types and powers of institu-
tions that deal with legislative, administra-
tive, judicial, banking, commercial, welfare,
informational, and similar activities in the
entity or system. But they also embrace such
informal attributes as access to and influ-
ence over decision-making processes; the
number and configuration of political parties
and interest groups; the number and distribu-
tion of religious, linguistic, and ethnic ag-
gregations ; the social and geographical mo-
bility of the population; the extent and con-
figurations of pluralistic cross-cutting bonds;
and the nature and stability of the resulting
coalitions.
By the cultural attributes of a social entity,
we mean strictly the distribution of the psy-
chological properties of the individuals who
comprise that particular system; this reduc-
tionist definition explicitly excludes any so-
called emergent or organic properties of the
system ’as a whole’, so as to avoid reification
and any suggestion that social groups may
have personalities, purposes, etc. The cul-
tural dimension embraces the distribution of
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individual personalitiy types, attitudes, and
opinions, and extends to the way in which
all three of these psychological attributes
relate to the way things are, should be, and
will be; these can be thought of, respectively,
as perceptions, preferences, and predictions.
We can, in turn, treat the distribution of
personalities as national (or any other
system’s) character, that of attitudes as
ideology, and that of opinion as cultural
climate.
To summarize, the above set of dimen-
sions should permit us to describe a nation
or any social entity, compare it to itself at
different points in time, and compare it to
other entities at the same or different levels
of analysis at the same or different point in
time. To put it in Allport’s suggestive lan-
guage, these attributes permit us to deal with
our objects of analysis in terms of theirbeing
and in terms of their becoming, and having
done this, we can then move on to deal with
their behaving and interacting.
While the distinction between behavior and
inter-action (between/among actors) is self-
evident, one of the inadequacies of the Eng-
lish language and the concepts conveyed by
its vocabulary is that the word relationship
carries so wide a variety of meanings, but it
is used here in only two of its senses: that of
comparison and that of connectedness. Thus,
when we say that the political integration of
system X is very high in relation to that of
system Y, we are comparing the two systems
on a particular set of attributes. The con-
fusion, as well as the distinctions, between
these two meanings is well illustrated by the
notion of ’social distance’. Two systems may
be close or distant in terms of their position
on a given attribute scale, such as size,
ethnic homogeneity, or structural complexity.
They may also be close or distant in terms of
their interdependence or their friendship,
and there is absolutely no reason to expect
that entities that are close in the sense of
similarity will always be close in the sense of
connectedness or interdependence as well,
despite the frequency of this assumption
(implicit or otherwise) in the social sciences.
Let me mention here two other sources of
confusion. One is the relationship (sic) be-
tween relationships (in the sense of connec-
tions) among entities at one level of analysis
and the structure of any system at the next
higher level of aggregation; the other is the
relationship between such relationships and
interaction. To consider the first, many struc-
tural properties of a given system are infer-
red from observation of the relationships
among its sub-systems. We are often told
that a social system is more than the sum of
its parts, but this bromide often leads us into
all sorts of metaphysical pursuits, as we
search for the emergent or organic prop-
erties of the system itself. I maintain that a
system is nothing more than the sum of its
parts, along with the relationships and inter-
actions among them. This formulation is
important not only because it helps eliminate
much of the mysticism surrounding social
entities, but because it quickly converts a
difficult and costly process of observation
and measurement into a relatively straight-
forward one: many structural attributes of a
system may be inferred quite simply by ob-
serving the relationships among its compo-
nent parts. And we can discover the cultural
attributes of a system by observing the inter-
actions among its components, but this re-
quires a longer inferential leap, inasmuch as
we must first be confident of the extent to
which the behaviors comprising interaction
actually reflect cultural perceptions, predic-
tions, and preferences.
As to the other relationship - that be-
tween relationship and interaction - we
note that the first may be thought of as a
condition: the bonds and links that connect
two or more social entities. While relation-
ships are largely the consequence of inter-
action, and while we can often predict inter-
action events from observed relationships,
the differentiation between relationship and
interaction is critical to the empirical ex-
amination of many of our models and hypo-
theses.
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1.3 Measuring the incidence of international
war
Before utilizing this scheme to examine the
evidence as to which factors might cause,
explain, lead to, make for, or account for
fluctuations in the incidence of war, a brief
digression is in order. Surprising as it may
seem, scholars have been speculating on the
causes of war for centuries before they tried
to ascertain its empirical distribution, and
even today many of our theoretical disagree-
ments stem partly from the failure to identify
our population of cases, and from differing
conceptions and definitions of our outcome
variable (Blechman & Kaplan, 1978; Bloom-
field & Leiss, 1969; Bouthoul, 1951; Kende,
1971; Urlanis, 1960). But following on the
work of Sorokin, Richardson, and Wright,
the Correlates of War project at Michigan
has assembled what seems to be the popula-
tion of international (inter-state, imperial,
and colonial) and civil wars involving one or
more sovereign states any place in the world
since the Congress of Vienna, and has pre-
sented the coding rules, resulting data, and
summary statistics (Singer & Small, 1972;
Small et al., forthcoming).
In that handbook (Wages of War), we dif-
ferentiate among four basic indicators of the
incidence of war. The first is that of fre-
quency, and is measured by the onset of
sustained military hostilities between autho-
rized armed forces of two or more sovereign
national states culminating in at least 1,000
battle deaths. The second is severity, and is
measured by the number of battle deaths
resulting from a qualifying war; the third is
magnitude measured in terms of nation-
months of war; and the fourth is that of
intensity, measured in battle deaths per na-
tion month or per capita. While frequency is
measured only in the context of a given
time and space domain, the other three
indicators of the incidence of war can be
applied to a given war as well as to all of
the qualifying wars that occur in a specified
time and space domain. In most, but not all
of the studies summarized here, the Cor-
relates of War data base and indicators have
been used, and unless the choice of indicator
makes an appreciable difference, the results
will be reported in terms of the simplest indi-
cator of war: its frequency.
Yet another consideration when seeking
to account for the fluctuations in a given
phenomenon is the extent to which they
show a discernible regularity across time or
space. While I would not accept the proposi-
tion that goodness of fit between a given
distribution and one or another statistical
model permits a legitimate inference as to
the processes that produced that distribu-
tion, such regularities can certainly be sug-
gestive (Horvath, 1968; Voevodsky, 1969;
Weiss, 1963). Perhaps the most suggestive
fit would be that of periodicity, on the as-
sumption that a strong cyclical pattern might
imply a degree of inexorability in inter-
national warfare. And, given the frequency
with which cyclical patterns have been as-
serted, as well as the variety of inferences
drawn from these putative patterns (Alcock,
1972; Davis et al., 1978; Denton & Phillips,
1968; Dewey, 1964), it may be worth report-
ing the results of a fairly systematic search
for them. Simply put, we have found only
the weakest trace of periodicity in the inci-
dence of all international warfare over these
160 years, with a barely discernible cycle of
20-odd years (Singer & Small, 1972). More
important, when we look at the war ex-
periences of the more war-prone nations one
at a time, virtually every conceivable tech-
nique fails to produce evidence for any kind
of regularity (Singer & Cusack, 1980). Thus,
it is perfectly true that there are peaks and
troughs in the time plots of war at both the
national and the systematic levels, but the
time intervals between those peaks and/or
troughs are of sufficiently random length to
support the sceptical conclusions of Sorokin
(1937, p. 359) and Richardson (1960a, pp.
129-30 and 140). I would not, however, want
to foreclose further research into the ques-
tion, especially from the war expansion and
contagion perspective. That is, despite the
diverse results - stemming from diverse
domains, indicators, and techniques - the
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evidence for addiction to war on the part of
the system or any nation seems weak. But a
close reading of Davis, Duncan, and Siverson
(1978) and Siverson and King (1980) sug-
gests that more complex models of diffusion
and contagion - via alliance bonds -
might well stand against the empirical test.
If war itself does not appear and re-appear
in a regular cyclical fashion, it is unlikely
that it results to any important extent from
any other single-factor cycle, be it com-
mercial, agricultural, climatic, or demogra-
phic. Rather, if there are indeed cyclical
phenomena at work, there must be several of
them involved in this process (Hart, 1946;
Sorokin, 1937), with their concatenations
falling at relatively irregular intervals. While
there seems to be no concentrated research
effort in this direction at the moment, it cer-
tainly appears to be worth pursuing further,
perhaps when more is known regarding the
time-space distributions of some of the more
promising explanatory variables. Let us,
then, attempt a brief and admittedly selective
survey of these latter as they impinge on the
incidence of international war.
2. Findings to date on the incidence of war
To reiterate a point that has already been
noted, there is no substitute for a good the-
oretical model when laying out an empirical
investigation, but when we are not nearly far
enough along to even specify the key var-
iables of such a model, we have little choice
but to work within a multi-theoretical frame-
work and get on with our more inductive ef-
forts. The problem now is one of identifying
the results of the inductive work to date,
some (but not all) of which has been shaped
by the proposed framework, and to see how
far it permits us to summarize and synthesize
these diverse findings. We will work with
three of the levels of aggregation noted
earlier, and within each, look at the extent
to which the several classes of variables seem
to be accounting historically for the incidence
of war. And, reflecting my strong suspicion
that variables of a systemic and dyadic sort
will turn out to be more powerful than those
at the national and the decision-making levels
of aggregation, let me deal with the findings
at these levels in that order.
While it is often a rule of thumb to look
first at the phenomena that are closest - in
space or time - to the outcome we seek to
explain, there seem to be reasonable grounds
for not doing so in the case of war. While
these grounds are far from conventional and
the evidence for them is sparse, space limita-
tions permit only stark assertions here; for a
more detailed justification, see Singer (1961
and 1976). First, I assume that there is a
great deal of homogeneity in the intellectual
style of foreign policy/national security de-
cision makers from nation to nation and
from decade to decade over the past century
or so. Similarly, there seems to be a remark-
able homogeneity in the decision rules that
nations follow, especially when they are in
conflict, again irrespective of such allegedly
critical distinctions as regime type, national
culture and ideology, and level of economic
development (Rosenau, 1966). These two
assumptions suggest that we will not find a
great deal of variation at the decisional and
national levels, and therefore should not ex-
pect the attributes of nations or their deci-
sion makers to be very powerful in explain-
ing so varying an outcome as war/no war.
A second consideration that follows quite
logically is that most of the variation in the
behavior of nations in conflict will be ac-
counted for, not by their internal attributes,
but by variation in their environment. That
environment can, in turn, be viewed as hav-
ing two basic components; the dyadic rela-
tionship with another nation, and the re-
gional or global systemic context in which
the conflicting nation finds itself. From this,
it follows that we might expect to find the
dyadic relationship and the properties of the
system to carry us further in accounting for
the incidence of international war than would
the attributes of the nations or their decision
making organizations (Zinnes, 1980a). Thus,
we will begin with the systemic environment
and examine some of the empirical evidence
to date, and then move on to the effects of
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dyadic phenomena. But, to reiterate, the
selection is intended to be more represent-
ative and suggestive than exhaustive.
2.1 Systemic attributes
Despite the possible attractiveness of the
above argument, few other investigators into
the war/peace question have accepted it, and
as a result, a fair fraction of research on the
systemic conditions associated with war has
emanated so far largely from the Michigan
Correlates of War project. Further, of the
three types of systemic conditions - mate-
rial, structural, and cultural - most of the
reproducible evidence to date reflects the
structural dimension (Sullivan, 1976). Un-
fortunately, there is little systematic work on
such material attributes of the system as
weapons technology, industrial development,
resource limits, climate, or demographic pat-
terns. Similarly, outside of some preliminary
efforts by Kegley et al. (1979), Choi (1978),
and Gantzel (1972) little effort has been
invested in the search for systematic con-
nections between cultural conditions and the
incidence of war. On the other hand, re-
searchers of a scientific bent have been as
assiduous in their examination of structural
correlates of war as their methodologically
traditional colleagues, and it is to that litera-
ture that we now turn.
Perhaps the most plausible of the system’s
structural attributes in the war/peace context
is that of the configurations generated by
alliance bonds, with those generated by dis-
tributions of power following closely behind.
Looking first at the structural characteristic
known as bipolarity, we usually have in mind
the extent to which the nations in a given
geographical region, or in the major power
sub-set (a functional ’region’), or world-wide,
are clustered into two clearly opposed coali-
tions. While there are several definitions of
bipolarity and rather diverse operational
indicators, it generally implies the degree of
conformity to an ’ideal’ condition in which
all of the nations are - via military alli-
ance - in one or another of two equally
powerful coalitions with no alliance bonds
between the polar blocs, and full bondedness
within each. While such a set of conditions
has never obtained, the reasoning is that
even an approximation would so severely
hamper the conflict resolving efficacy of the
pluralistic cross-cutting, multiple balancing
mechanism of the system as to make con-
flict escalation and war much more likely
(Deutsch & Singer, 1964; Waltz, 1964; Rose-
crance et al., 1974; Kaplan, 1954; Liska,
1956). But like all too many theoretical
hunches in the world politics field, there is
an equally plausible counter-argument: that
so clearly bipolar a system structure would
eliminate all ambiguity as to who is on whose
side, or as to the possibility of military vic-
tory, that war would just never be considered.
Rather, according to this orientation, war
occurs when there is ambiguity, either be-
cause behavior becomes less predictable and
governments stumble into war, or because
governments have a ’drive toward certainty’,
and war helps to clarify the picture.
In any event, the research findings to date
only partially resolve the theoretical dis-
agreements. In one of the first systematic
analyses, Singer and Small (1968) found that
the relationship between their indicators of
polarity and war differed in the 19th and
20th centuries. In the earlier epoch, higher
polarity levels tended to be followed by
lower levels of international war, but in the
period since 1900, fluctuations in the inci-
dence of war were positively associated with
the fluctuations in polarity. In a follow-up,
Wallace (1973) used a somewhat different
indicator of polarity and found a curvilinear
association, with war levels generally associ-
ated with very high bipolarity scores or very
low ones, suggesting - for the entire 1816-
1965 period - that there may be an optimal
level of three or four relatively discernible
alliance clusters, with war levels quite low
when those intermediate conditions obtain.
In a third and more recent analysis of the
question, Bueno de Mesquita (1978) found
that fluctuations in war were accounted for
less by the level of bipolarity in the system
than by the direction and rate of change in
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the alliance configurations that might pro-
duce such bipolarity. That is, the amount of
war in the system since the Congress of
Vienna tended to rise when the ’tightness’ of
alliance clusters was on the increase. Even
more confusing are Levy’s finding (1979)
that bipolarity makes for maximum stability
and unipolarity for maximum war, and
Wayman’s finding (1981) that cluster polarity
exercises a different effect than power polar-
ity. Perhaps Ostrom and Aldrich (1978, p.
765) summarize things best in reporting that
’our results have a distinctly negative flavor’.
As might be expected, there are several
interesting extensions of the bipolarity-war
hypothesis. The simplest is that since alli-
ances involving one set of major powers will
generally be in opposition to other majors,
the greater the percentage of major powers
in alliance, the greater the bipolarity of the
system as a whole, and thus the greater (or
lesser) will be the incidence of war in the
ensuing years. Once again, the empirical
findings are mixed; Singer and Small (1968)
found that their alliance aggregation indica-
tor, which was indeed highly correlated with
their bipolarity index, predicted positively to
the incidence of war in the 1900-1945 period,
but negatively in the 1816-1899 period. Im-
posing more stringent analytical tests and
slightly different indicators, Ostrom and
Hole (1978) turned up similar, but con-
siderably weaker patterns.
A more complex version of this systemic
hypothesis can be interpreted in two ways.
One is that the concentration of military and
industrial capabilities tends to follow the
concentration of national coalitions and
groupings (especially the majors), and that
the concentration of these capabilities should
have the same effect on the incidence of war
as the concentration of the nations into a
small number of tight polar groupings. While
this isomorphism does occur from time to
time, it is not constant enough to make this
interpretation very compelling. Thus, one
takes a more generalized view and treats
both types of concentration as producing a
high degree of clarity in the system’s struc-
ture. And to the extent that the systemic
environment is clear and unambiguous as to:
a) who will fight on which side if a conflict
escalates to war, and b) which side will
probably win that war, the decision makers
are thought to be less likely to either enter-
tain the war option or to merely stumble
into war.
Regardless of the theoretical interpreta-
tion, the empirical investigations lead once
more to inconsistent results. And, as before,
a major anomoly is the inter-century one. In
the 19th century, high concentration of
capabilities in the hands of a very few powers
makes for increases in the incidence of war,
while more equal distributions are associated
with low levels of war (Singer, Bremer and
Stuckey, 1972). But in the period 1900-1965,
high concentrations lead to low levels of
warfare and low concentrations are associ-
ated with higher levels of war. In a follow-up
study, Champion and Stoll (1980) went a
step further and: a) introduced an important
control variable, classifying each major
power as either ’satisfied’ or ’dissatisfied’ on
the eve of each war as reflected in the
historians’ consensus; and b) calculated the
concentrations in terms of coalitions, rather
than concentrations in terms of the nations
separately and individually. These modifica-
tions appreciably enhanced the post-dictive
power of the capability distribution model
across the full time period, suggesting that if
the blocs have indeed been accurately iden-
tified and the powers accurately classified on
the ’satisfaction’ dimension, this systemic
factor may be of considerable importance.
But as the authors remind us, the validity of
these additional indicators remains to be
more fully demonstrated. In an interesting
variation on this theme, Cannizzo (1978)
examined the effect of such capability con-
figurations on the major powers individually,
and found that these were far from uniform;
concentrations and changes therein strongly
affected France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary,
for example, while having little impact on
the war experiences of England, Japan, and
Russia. Wayman (1980) found that wars oc-
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curring under conditions of high concentra-
tion are less severe than those occurring when
capabilities are more evenly distributed.
Another factor - related to the others in
the sense that it taps the structural clarity
dimension - is that of status inconsistency,
aggregated to the systemic level. In two of
the earlier investigations, Wallace (1971)
and East (1972) found moderately clear as-
sociations between the incidence of inter-
national war and the extent to which the
rank scores of the nations on the material
capability and diplomatic importance dimen-
sions were inconsistent with one another.
That is, the more similar the systemic pecking
orders on power and on prestige, the less
war-prone the system was in the years fol-
lowing. On the other hand, the inquiries by
Ray (1974) and Gochman (1980) produced
more ambiguous results, perhaps due in part
to the use of different indicators.
2.2 Dyadic conditions
While there is a clear conceptual differ-
ence between the structural characteristics of
a system and the relationships among the
component units of the system, it is worth
reiterating their empirical and conceptual
connections. As noted earlier, most systemic
properties rest upon, and can be inferred
from, the links and bonds among the com-
ponents, and while some scholars have
sought their indicators of system structure in
the triad (Harary, 1961), most of the data-
based work has been restricted to the more
manageable ’two-body problem’, to borrow
from the vocabulary of physics. Following
the distinction noted earlier, we will treat
dyadic conditions of a relational sort first,
and then turn to those of a comparative sort,
resting not on the links, but on the similar-
ities, between nations.
As to the former, we again find the famil-
iar emphasis upon alliance bonds, followed
by the bonds created via membership in dis-
cernible diplomatic clusters, trading blocs,
and international organizations. First, we
discover that, in general, nations with formal
and long-standing alliance bonds experience
a significantly higher frequency of war than
do those without them (Small & Singer,
1966); on the other hand, Sabrosky (1980)
found that nations that were allied to one
another had a very low probability of going
to war against one another. Neither case
suggests anything as to the intentions of the
alliance makers (Singer & Bueno de Mes-
quita, 1973). Looking at another type of
bond, Skjelsbaek (1971) found that war op-
ponents tended to decrease their shared inter-
governmental organization memberships in
the five-year period preceding the onset of
war, and Singer and Wallace (1970) found
that while most IGOs were founded after the
termination of war, there was virtually no
relationship between the number of them in
the system and the amount of interstate war
experienced in the subsequent five years.
More surprisingly, Gochman (1980) found
that militarized disputes between major trad-
ing partners were more likely to escalate to
war than were disputes between states that
did not heavily trade with each other.
Shifting from the role of dyadic bonds
and associations in accounting for the inci-
dence of war to that of similarities and dif-
ferences, the ubiquitous dimension of power
again captures most of our attention. The
theoretical argument is rather direct: even
though sub-military conflict seems to be no
more likely between nations of very unequal
strength than between those of approximate
parity, this factor should become more crit-
ical as the war threshold is approached. The
familiar dictum is that the weaker dare not
fight and the stronger need not; the corol-
lary is that one purpose of war is to ascertain
which party is stronger when any doubt does
exist.
While the evidence on this question is
relatively consistent, the final word has
hardly been said. For example, Gamham
(1976a) found that equality in population
reduced the likelihood of dyadic war, but
that equality in geographical size or industrial
base did not, in the 1816-1965 period. Con-
trolling for geographical contiguity, how-
ever, both he (1976b) and Weede (1976), as
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well as Barringer (1972) and Wright (1965),
found that nations that were approximately
equal in material capabilities were signif-
icantly more likely to carry their disputes to
war than were nations of discernible dis-
parity. Further, Stoll and Champion (1977)
found that serious disputes were more likely
to escalate to war if the weak side was the
initiator of the dispute; disputes initiated by
the stronger side were less likely to end in
war. Mihalka (1976) found that once mil-
itary force was threatened or used, the
greater the disparity in capabilities of the
disputants, the less likely the dispute was to
escalate to hostilities. More recently, Singer
and his colleagues (1979a) found that while
only 13 % of all major power militarized
disputes since 1816 escalated to war, that
figure rose to 20 % when the parties were
approximately equal in military terms, and
to 75 % if such parity was combined with
rapid military buildup during the three years
prior to the dispute.
A second emphasis in this literature is
more diffuse, but worth noting briefly, given
the theoretical pervasiveness of its assump-
tions. That is, the more similar two nations
are in terms of certain political or cultural
attributes, the more friendly their relation-
ship might be expected to be, and the
more friendly they are, the less frequently
or severely might they be expected to
wage war against one another. Here, too,
Richardson (1960a) was the first to look into
the question systematically, and he found
little historical evidence to support the clas-
sical view. For the period 1820-1949 and
using his population of 300-odd wars and
military disputes, he found that neither a
common language nor a common religion
had a depressing effect on the incidence of
dyadic war (pp. 230-31). To the contrary, as
he himself demonstrated (pp. 285-86) and as
others have confirmed (Gleditsch and Sin-
ger, 1975), geographical contiguity is the
confounding variable. That is, since geo-
graphical neigbors are not only more likely
to be culturally similar but also to have
more sources of conflict and to be more
accessible to one another’s armies, it fol-
lows that such similarities should actually be
related to dyadic war in the positive direction
(Gantzel, 1972).
These findings lead, in turn, to another of
the more interesting paradoxes in research to
date. Reference is to the effect of common
boundaries, with the reasonable hypothesis
that the greater the number of immediate
neighbors a nation has, the more frequently
it will be drawn into warfare against one or
another of them. While Richardson’s data
(1960a, p. 177) tend to support this hypoth-
esis, the findings of Starr and Most (1978)
do not. Rather, they find an inverse rela-
tionship between a nation’s war proneness
and the number of immediate neighbors. Nor
should these results be surprising, when we
consider that the number of direct neigh-
bors is physically a function of a land-locked
nation’s gcographic size vis-a-vis that of its
neighbors. The longer its boundaries, the
greater the number of others that can border
on it, and the smaller these latter are, the
more numerous they can be. From this, it
follows that the greater will be the discrep-
ancy between its size (and strength, all else
being equal) and theirs, and given the find-
ing that war is more likely between equals, it
again follows that the frequency of war
should be lower.
2.3 National attributes and relationships
In an earlier section I indicated that national
attributes seemed less crucial in accounting
for war than either systemic or dyadic con-
ditions, and before summarizing the evidence
to date, let me expand on that assertion.
Briefly put, the exigencies of survival in an
international system of such inadequate or-
ganization and with so pervasively dysfunc-
tional a culture require relatively uniform
response. That is, for a national entity to
adapt to and survive in such an environment,
it must achieve a fair degree of political
mobilization, military preparedness, and
political centralization. Despite great differ-
ences in tradition and culture, or great ap-
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parent differences in political regime and
economic arrangements, these external con-
siderations tend to reinforce the essential
domestic similarity of national states, regard-
less of their size, strength, level of economic
development, etc.
To what extent does the empirical evidence
to date support this alleged lack of cross-
national variation in the attributes that might
be associated with the incidence of war? On
the one hand, certain of these attributes do
seem to be related to the frequency and/or
severity of national war experiences (Richard-
son, 1960a; Rummel, 1972), with overall
military-industrial capabilities the most po-
tent predictor. In a systematic examination
of the relationship between a six-dimensional
index of such capabilities and war proneness
since the Congress of Vienna, Bremer
(1980) found a very strong positive correla-
tion between the strength of nations (includ-
ing industrial development and military pre-
paredness) and their tendency to go to war.
Using a more restricted indicator, reflecting
the size of the military establishment, and
using more general indicators of foreign con-
flict, several studies further confirm this
positive association with national strength
(Naroll, 1969; Choucri and North, 1975;
Small, 1978; Weede, 1970).
On the other hand, if we turn to more
complex models that might link national
characteristics to war proneness, the findings
are considerably more ambiguous. Applying
the sociological concept of status inconsist-
ency to nations whose material capabilities
are high and whose attributed diplomatic
status scores are low (or vice-versa), neither
Ray (1974) nor Gochman (1980) found any
consistent pattern. Another domestic char-
acteristic that has often been thought of as
contributing to national war proneness is
that of domestic instability. Yet no investiga-
tion identified much of an association until
Wilkenfeld (1973) controlled for regime
type, and found, for part of the post-World
War II period, several clear associations.
However, looking at regime type alone and
examining the full L8I6-19fi5 period, Small
and Singer (1974) found that autocratic and
democratic regimes were equally likely to
both initiate wars and to become embroiled
in them, but Haas (1965) found, at least for
the twentieth century, that democratic re-
gimes were less war prone than authoritarian
ones. He also concludes in the same study
that wealthy urbanized nations, especially
during periods of social strain, are partic-
ularly susceptible to war involvement.
Shifting from attributes of an essentially
internal sort to external relationships, the
dimension most often examined is that of
alliance bonds. In studies covering members
of the interstate system since 1816, both
Singer and Small (1966) and Siverson and
King (1978) find a strong positive association
between alliance involvement and war prone-
ness ; this is not to suggest that the relation-
ship rests on the high reliability of alliance
commitments (Sabrosky, 1980). And, given
the well-known association between high
capabilities and high alliance involvement, as
well as that between capabilities and war
proneness, this should come as no surprise.
On a related dimension and picking up the
geographical variables summarized earlier in
the dyadic context, Richardson (1960a)
found a positive relationship between the
number of neighbors a nation had and the
frequency of its wars from 1820 to 1945, and
Wesley (1969), Weede (1970), Midlarsky
(1975), and Starr and Most (1978) found
relatively similar patterns for comparable
spatial-temporal domains. Finally, Gleditsch
and Singer (1975) examined the effect of a
nation’s mean distance from all other sov-
ereign members of the system, and they, too,
found a positive relationship; the more cen-
trally located they were, the more war they
experienced.
The tentative inference from this limited
set of studies is that such basic geo-strategic
factors as location and strength seem to be
of importance, but that despite persuasive
arguments to the contrary (Rosenau, 1966),
domestic factors of a less material sort would
appear to be rather negligible in accounting
for the war proneness of individual nations.
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2.4 Behavioral and interactional patterns
To this juncture, our focus has been on the
extent to which the frequency and magnitude
of war might be accounted for historically by
the contextual and ecological variables: fluc-
tuations in systemic, dyadic, or national con-
ditions. Following the check list implied in the
taxonomy, this leaves untouched the ques-
tion of behavior itself: to what extent can
we account for war by the actions and inter-
actions of the nations? Given the emphasis
on diplomatic and military behavior in the
speculative literature on war, one might ex-
pect to find a respectable body of empirical
work on the question. The fact that we do
not, however, need not be very surprising.
First of all, behavioral phenomena are more
elusive and seem to be more difficult to ob-
serve and measure. Second, a good many
researchers suspect that behavioral patterns
are so heavily determined by the ecological
conditions summarized above that these for-
mer will account for very little variation in
our outcome. Third, and closely related, is
the suspicion that we can treat ecological
variables as surrogates of behavior, given
their assumed covariation, and thus avoid
all of the grief associated with the observa-
tion and measurement of behavior.
Be that as it may, there is a modest body
of empirical work in which behavior patterns
serve as predictors, and once again Richard-
son offers a convenient point of departure.
Perhaps his most important contribution is
found in the posthumous Arms and Insecur-
ity (1.960b), where he derives and then puts
to the test a simple differential equation
designed to capture the essence of an inter-
active arms race. Vis-a-vis the arms expend-
iture patterns preceding the two World Wars,
the model offers a fairly good fit, and gen-
erally supports the notion that each pro-
tagonist’s annual increase will be a function
of the other’s absolute expenditure in the
previous year, controlling for a fatigue fac-
tor and an exacerbation factor.
These analyses have stimulated the devel-
opment of a rich and diverse array of fol-
low-up models, a fair number of which have
been tested against various 19th and 20th
century arms interaction processes. While it
would require a major review article to sum-
marize and interpret this body of research
(Kurakawa, 1978; Luterbacher, 1974; Zin-
nes, 1980b) two general conclusions seem
justified. One is that we have not yet been
able to separate the effects of the domestic
and foreign stimuli at the various stages of
arms races, and the other is that we have
yet to differentiate between the profiles or
’signatures’ of those that have ended in war
and those that have not (Singer, 1970). But
two important findings have resulted from
Wallace’s work in this area. In an earlier
study (1971), he not only found that status
inconsistency levels in the international
system predicted system-wide increases in
military expenditures, but also that these in-
creases predicted in turn the incidence of
war. In a later analysis (1979) Wallace found
that if two nations started a military con-
frontation, their likelihood of crossing the
war threshold ~~~as considerably lower if they
were not in an arms race with one another,
but much higher if they were.
An even more elusive problem arises when
we shift from military expenditures and arms
acquisition to less easily observed behavior
such as the diplomatic moves and counter-
moves associated with the escalation of con-
flict. But a satisfactory coding and scaling
scheme has been developed (Leng and Sin-
ger, 1977). In some preliminary analyses,
Leng (29$0) found that the use of threats had
a higher probability of ending in war when
met with a defiant counter-threat, whereas
there is no clear association between the
mere frequency of threats and the onset of
war. In an earlier set of investigations, North
et al. (1964) combined behavior and percep-
tion in order to examine their reciprocal
effects in a number of crises, particularly
that preceding World War I. In general, they
found a propensity toward over-estimation
of the adversary’s intentions (compared with
his actual behavior) and an under-estimation
of his relative capabilities, the combination
of which leads to escalatory behavior.
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Not surprisingly, and despite the attention
of diplomatic historians and traditional polit-
ical scientists, the systematic examination of
the relationship between behavioral phe-
nomena and war has lagged discernibly be-
hind that of the other three sets of factors
discussed earlier. While the explanation lies
partially in the observation and measurement
problem noted above, this lag also reflects
the reasonable idea that the more we first
discover regarding the effects of the ecolog-
ical conditions, the greater the theoretical
mileage we will obtain from subsequent
analyses of the behavioral and interactional
phenomena.
3. Conclusion
While this summary hardly suggests that we
are well on the way to understanding the
causes of war and conditions of peace (to use
Wright’s phrase), some modest optimism
would not be completely out of place. That
is, despite the limited amount of research
and the relative lack of convergence in our
findings, there are two grounds for believing
that we are no longer moving in non-cumu-
lative circles. First, we are finally seeing
systematic research that rests on reproducible
evidence, and after several centuries of pre-
operational speculation, this is to be ap-
plauded. Second, despite the diversity of
theoretical orientations, there seems to be a
growing awareness that the resulting para-
digms and investigations need not be in-
compatible.
On the one hand, my sense is that re-
searchers in the war-peace sector are in-
creasingly aware of the difference between
explaining the high incidence of recurrent
conflict and rivalry of a non-military sort,
and explaining the low - but destructive -
incidence of war. The range of models
intended to address the former question is,
admittedly, impressive in its diversity. But
that, in my judgment, is a less critical prob-
lem ; conflict is ubiquitous in all social
systems and the problem is not to prevent it,
but to reduce the frequency with which it
becomes socially destructive. Thus, when we
shift from conflict in general to war in
particular, we find a diminished and more
manageable array of theoretical models (Bur-
ton, 1962; Hoffmann, 1965; Holsti, 1972;
Kaplan, 1957; Wallensteen, 1973; Midlarsky,
1975; Russett, 1974). And, on the other
hand, a close scrutiny of these models shows
a remarkable overlap, if not convergence. To
illustrate, let me mention some of the em-
phases found in the literature most fre-
quently : realpolitik, arms race, power transi-
tion, economic development, and imperial-
ism. There are indeed those who insist that
such models are not only inconsistent with
one another logically and empirically, but
also not even subject to comparative analysis
and testing. There are even those who insist
on a different epistemology and assert that
the western scientific method is inappropriate
to the examination of rival models and
hypotheses. But my suspicion is that their
numbers and influence are on the wane, and
that a compelling theoretical convergence
could encourage a more open-minded ex-
amination of the empirical evidence.
In order to move toward such a theoret-
ical convergence, two prior steps would seem
necessary. First, we need to identify the ex-
tent to which these competing models rest
upon similar explanatory variables. Given the
Babel-like discourse of theorizers and prac-
titioners, this might appear to be impossible.
But as systematic empirical work goes for-
ward, one inexorable consequence is the
translation of ideologically loaded verbaliza-
tion into operationally defined variables, and
the evidence to date is that devotees of rather
diverse approaches can agree on (at least)
the face validity of these indicators. More-
over, it looks as if a rather wide range of
putatively explanatory concepts can be
validly translated into identical indicators.
Thus, ’defining our terms’ and operationaliz-
ing our variables may well reveal a consider-
able degree of convergence amongst theoret-
ical models that have often been thought of
as hopelessly divergent and incomparable.
Second, we need to recognize that at rock
bottom the most important difference
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amongst the contending causes of war models
is that of the foreign policy decision process.
That is, each model assumes - often im-
plicitly - a different class of decision
makers in power, and each postulates a dif-
ferent set of decision rules. Thus, one stra-
tegy might be to conceive of the policy mak-
ing process in terms of interest aggregation,
with the decision makers seen as trying to
respond to and balance a complex array of
international incentives and constraints vis-
a-vis an equally complex array of domestic
interests, including their own. Once those
assumptions and postulations have been
teased out of the verbal models, our highly
general paradigm might then be converted
into operational versions of the several more
specific models. Note that we have assumed,
to this juncture, a high degree of homo-
geneity in decision makers and the rules they
employ, but to move closer to a full explana-
tion, that assumption would have to be
relaxed.
These assumptions, however, should be put
to the empirical/historical test directly, and
this is why the research described in the
body of this paper can be so valuable. It is
one thing to observe and then classify the
backgrounds and interest group affiliations
of foreign policy elites in a wide range of
nations across an appreciable span of time;
while this research task is far from com-
plete, it is clearly manageable. But the deci-
sion rules that they employ, and the utilities
that they assign to various outcomes in the
economic, diplomatic, and military sectors
will remain forever beyond the range of
direct observation. Thus, we have little
choice but to rely on careful inference, and
the most solid basis for inferring their de-
cision criteria will be found in the sort of
evidence discussed above, especially when
embedded in computerized representations
of the historical process (Alker and Brunner,
1969; Bremer, 1977). Under which systemic,
dyadic, and national conditions do which
foreign policy elites respond to which be-
havioral stimuli of which other nations in
which specific f ashion? The more fully we
can answer these empirical questions, the
more reliably can we infer the decision rules
that are at work. And the more we can check
these inferences against those that are em-
bedded in the rival models, the closer we can
get to their confirmation and disconfirma-
tion.
This brief overview leaves out a great deal
of important detail, just as our survey of the
evidence to date is far from complete; a
more complete picture emerges in three re-
cent volumes from the Michigan project:
Explaining War, 1979; Correlates of War I:
Research Origins and Rationale, 1979; and
Correlates of War II: Testing Some Real-
politik Models, 1980. But these pages should
serve to remind us that the causes-of-war
question is not only a researchable one,
soluble in principle. They also serve to re-
mind us that the task is finally under way,
and if the scientific talent and the necessary
support can be mobilized, we may yet be in
time to put an end to one of the most
destructive and dysfunctional activities
known to human history.
REFERENCES
Alcock, N. Z. 1972. The War Disease. Oakville,
Canada: Canadian Peace Research Institute.
Alker, H., and Brunner, R. 1969. Simulating inter-
national conflict. International Studies Quarterly,
13/1: 70-110.
Ardrey, R. 1966 The Territorial Imperative. New
York: Atheneum.
Barringer, R. E. 1972. War: Patterns of Conflict.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Blainey, G. 1973. The Causes of War. New York:
Free Press.
Blechman, B. M. and Kaplan, S. S. 1978. Force
Without War. Washington, D. C.: Brookings
Institute.
Bloch, I. 1899. The Future of War. New York:
Doubleday & McClure.
Bloomfield, L. and Leiss, A. 1969. Controlling
Small Wars. New York: Knopf.
Bouthoul, G. 1951. Les Guerres: Elements de
Polemologie. Paris: Payot.
Bremer, S. A., Singer, J. D. and Luterbacher, U.
The population density and war proneness of
European nations 1816-1965. Comparative Polit-
ical Studies, 6/3: 329-348.
Bremer, S. A. 1977. Simulated Worlds. Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
16
Bremer, S. A. 1980. National capabilities and war
proneness. In Correlates of War II: Testing Some
Realpolitik Models, ed. J. D. Singer. New York:
Free Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. June 1978. Systemic polar-
ization and the occurrence and duration of war.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22/2: 241-267.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1981. The War Trap. New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press.
Burton, J. W. 1962. Peace Theory. New York:
Knopf.
Cannizzo, C. 1978. Capability distribution and
major power war experience, 1816-1965. Orbis,
21/4: 947-957.
Champion, M. and Stoll, R. In press. Capability
concentration, alliance bonding, and conflict
among the major powers. In Alliances and Inter-
national Conflict, ed. A. N. Sabrosky. Philadel-
phia : Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Choi, K. L. 1978. An Empirical Investigation of the
Relationship Between International Legal Norms
Relevant to the Control of Violence and the
Amount of International War. Seoul, Korea:
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy,
mimeo.
Choucri, N. and North, R. C. 1975. Nations in Con-
flict. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Davis, W., Duncan, G. and Siverson, R. 1978. The
dynamics of warfare, 1816-1965. American Jour-
nal of Political Science, 22/4: 772-792.
Dedring, J. 1976. Recent Advances in Peace and
Conflict Research. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Denton, F. H. and Phillips, W. 1968. Some patterns
in the history of violence. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 12/2: 182-195.
Deutsch, K. W. and Singer, J. D. 1964. Multipolar
power systems and international stability. World
Politics, 16/3: 390-406.
Deutsch, K. W. and Senghaas, D. 1971. A frame-
work for a theory of war and peace. In Search
for World Order, ed. A. Lepawsky et al. New
York: Appleton-Century. pp. 23-46.
Dewey, E. R. 1964. The 177-Year Cycle in War,
600 B. C. - A. D. 1957. Pittsburgh: Foundation
for the Study of Cycles.
East, M. A. 1972. Status discrepancy and violence
in the international system: An empirical anal-
ysis. In The Analysis of International Politics, ed.
V. Davis et al. New York: Free Press. pp. 299-
319.
Ferris, W. H. 1973. The Power Capabilities of
Nation States. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books.
Fornari, F. 1974. Psychoanalysis of War. Garden
City, N. Y.: Doubleday.
Galtung, J. 1964. A structural theory of aggression.
Journal of Peace Research, 1/2: 95-119.
Gantzel, K. J. 1972. System und Akteur: Beitr&auml;ge
zur Vergleichenden Kriegsursachenforschung.
D&uuml;sseldorf: Bertelsmann.
Garnham, D. 1976a. Dyadic International War,
1816-1965: the role of power parity and geo-
graphical proximity. Western Political Quarterly,
29/2: 231-242.
Garnham, D. 1976 b. Power parity and lethal inter-
national violence 1969-1973. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 20/3: 379-394.
Garnham, D. 1979. The Causes of War: Systemic
Findings. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: University of
Wisconsin Department of Political Science.
Gleditsch, N. P. and Singer, J. D. 1975. Distance
and international war 1816-1965. Proceedings of
the International Peace Research Association,
fifth general conference. Oslo, 481-506.
Gochman, C. S. 1980. Status, capabilities, and
major power conflict. In Correlates of War II:
Testing Some Realpolitik Models, ed. J. D. Sin-
ger, New York: Free Press.
Haas, M. 1965. Societal approaches to the study of
war. Journal of Peace Research, 4: 307-323.
Harary, F. June 1961. A structural analysis of the
situation in the Middle East in 1956. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 5/2: 167-78.
Hart, H. 1946. Depression, war, and logistic trends.
American Journal of Sociology, 52: 112-122.
Hoffman, S. 1965. The State of War. New York:
Praeger.
Holsti, O. 1972. Crisis, Escalation, War. Montreal:
McGill-Queens Univ. Press.
Horvath, W. J. Jan. 1968. A statistical model for
the duration of wars and strikes. Behavioral
Science, 13/1: 18-28.
Kaplan, M. A. 1957. System and Process in Inter-
national Politics. New York: John Wiley.
Kegley, C. W., et al. (eds.). 1975. International
Events and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign
Policy, Columbia, South Carolina: University of
South Carolina Press.
Kegley, C. W., Raymond, G. A., Choi, K. L.
August 1979. Fluctuations in Legal Norms and
Arbital Behavior, 1825-1970: indicators of major
power conflict? Columbia, South Carolina:
Department of Political Science.
Kegley, C. W. 1979. Measuring transformations in
the global legal system. In Law Making In The
Global Community, ed. M. G. Onuf. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Kende, I. 1971. Twenty-five years of local wars.
Journal of Peace Research, 8: 5-22.
Klingberg, F. L. 1952. The historical alternation of
moods in American foreign policy. World
Politics, 4/2: 239-273.
Kurokawa, S. 1978. A simple model of arms races:
Richardson’s model revisited. Prepared for deliv-
ery at the Hiroshima, Japan Conference of the
Peace Science Society (International).
Leng, R. J. 1980. Influence strategies and interstate
conflict. In The Correlates of War II: Testing
Some Realpolitik Models, ed. J. D. Singer. New
York: Free Press.
17
Leng, R. J. and Singer J. D. 1977. Towards a multi-
theoretical typology of international behavior. In
Mathematical Approaches to International Rela-
tions, ed. Bunge, Galtung & Malitza, Bucharest:
Romanian Academy of Social & Political Sci-
ences, 71-93.
Lenin, V.I. 1939. Imperialism. New York: Inter-
national Publishers.
Levy, J. S. 1979. The polarity of the system and
international stability. International Studies As-
sociation. Mimeo.
Liska, G. 1956. International Equilibrium. Cam-
bridge : Harvard University Press.
Lorenz, K. 1967. On Aggression. New York: Ban-
tom Books.
Luterbacher, U. 1974. Dimensions Historiques de
Modeles Dynamiques de Conflict. Leiden: A. W.
Sijthoff.
McClelland, D. 1961. The Achieving Society. New
York: Free Press.
Midlarsky, M. I. 1975. On War. New York: Free
Press.
Mihalka, M. 1976. Interstate Conflict in the Euro-
pean State System, 1816-1970. Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Uni-
versity of Michigan.
Morgenthau, H. J. 1948. Politics Among Nations.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Naroll, R. 1974. Military Deterrence in History.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Nelson, K. L., Olin, S. C. 1979. Why War?: Ideol-
ogy, Theory and History. Berkeley, Calif.: Univ.
of California Press.
North, R. C., Brody, R. A., Holsti, O. R. 1964.
Some empirical data on the conflict spiral. Peace
Research Society Papers, 1: 1-14.
Ostrom, C.. Aldrich, J. H. Nov. 1978. The rela-
tionship between size and stability in the major
power international system. American Journal of
Political Science, 22: 743-771.
Ostrom, C. and Hoole, F. June 1978. Alliances and
war revisited: a research note. International
Studies Quarterly, 22: 215-235.
Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics. New York:
Alfred Knopf.
Ray, J. L. 1974. Status inconsistency and war in-
volvement in Europe, 1816-1970. Peace Science
Society Papers, 23: 69-80.
Ray, J. L. 1980. The measurement of system struc-
ture. In The Correlates of War II: Testing Some
Realpolitik Models, ed. J. D. Singer. New York:
Free Press.
Richardson, L. F. 15. November 1941. Frequency
of occurrence of wars and other total quarrels.
Nature, 148/37-59.
Richardson, L. F. 1960a. Statistics of Deadly Quar-
rels. Pittsburgh: Boxwood.
Richardson, L. F. 1960 b. Arms and Insecurity.
Pittsburgh: Boxwood.
Rosecrance, R. et al. 1974. Power, Balance of
Power and Status in Nineteenth Century Inter-
national Relations. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Rosenau, J. N. 1966. Pre-theories and theories of
foreign policy. In Approaches to Comparative
and International Politics, ed. R. B. Farrell.
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press.
Rummel, R. J. 1972. The Dimensions of Nations.
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Russett, B. M. 1974. Power and Community in
World Politics. San Francisco: Freeman.
Sabrosky, A. D. 1980. Interstate alliances: their
reliability and the expansion of war. In Cor-
relates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik
Models, ed. J. D. Singer. New York: Free Press.
Secerov, S. 1919. Economic Phenomena Before and
After War. London: Rutledge.
Silberner, E. 1946. The Problem of War in Nine-
teenth Century Economic Thought. Princeton,
N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
Singer, J. D. October, 1961. The level-of-analysis
problem in international relations. World
Politics, 14/1: 77-92.
Singer, J. D. 1970. The outcome of arms races:
A policy problem and a research approach. Pro-
ceedings of the International Peace Research
Association, Third General Conference, 2:
137-46.
Singer, J. D. 1971. A General Systems Taxonomy
for Political Science. Morristown, N. J.: General
Learning Press.
Singer, J. D. 1976. The correlates of war project:
Continuity, diversity and convergence. In Quan-
titative International Politics: An Appraisal, eds.
F. Hoole and D. Zinnes, pp. 21-66. New York:
Praeger.
Singer, J. D. ed. 1979. Correlates of War I: Research
Origins and Rationale. New York: Free Press.
Singer, J. D. ed. 1979. Explaining War. Beverly
Hills, Calif: Sage.
Singer, J. D. 1979a. The Management of Serious
International Disputes. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Uni-
versity of Michigan Department of Political
Science.
Singer, J. D. ed. 1980. Correlates of War II: Testing
Some Realpolitik Models. New York: Free
Press.
Singer, J. D., Bremer, S. A. and Stuckey, J. 1972.
Capability distribution, uncertainty and major
power war, 1820-1965. In Peace, War & Num-
bers, ed. B. M. Russett. Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage. 19-48.
Singer, J. D. and Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1973.
Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and
Synthesis. Political Science Annual, IV, 237-280.
Singer, J. D. and Cusack, T. 1981. Periodicity, in-
exorability, and steersmanship in international
war. In From National Development to Global
Community, R. Merritt and B. M. Russett.
Singer, J. D. and Small, M. 1968. Alliance aggrega-
tion and the onset of war, 1815-1945. In Quan-
18
titative International Politics: Insights and Ev-
idence, ed. J. D. Singer. New York: Free Press.
Singer, J. D. and Small, M. 1972. The Wages of
War: A Statistical Handbook, 1816-1965. New
York: John Wiley.
Singer, J. D. and Wallace, M. 1970. Intergovern-
mental organization and the preservation of
peace, 1816-1964: Some bivariate relationships.
International Organization, 24/3: 520-47.
Siverson, R. and King, J. 1980. Attributes of na-
tional alliance membership and war participa-
tion, 1815-1965. American Jnl. of Political
Science, 24/1: 1-15.
Skjelsbaek, K. Shared membership in intergovern-
mental organizations and dyadic war, 1865-1964.
The United Nations: Problems & Prospects. St.
Louis, Mo.: University of Missouri Center for
International Studies.
Small, M. 1978. Does size make a difference? In
Studien i Dansk Udenrigspolitik, eds. N. Amstrup
and I. Faurby. Aarhus, Denmark: Forlaget
Politika.
Small, M., Singer, J. D. Summer, 1976. The war
proneness of democratic regimes. Jerusalem
Journal of International Relations, 1/4: 49-69.
Sorokin, Pitrim A. 1937. Social and Cultural Dy-
namics : Fluctuations of Social Relationships,
War and Revolution vol.3. New York: Amer-
ican Book.
Starr, H. and Most, B. Sept. 1978. A return journey.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22/3: 441-468.
Stoessinger, J. G. 1978. Why Nations Go to War.
New York: St. Martins.
Stoll, R. and Champion, M. November 1977.
Predicting the escalation of serious disputes to
international war: some preliminary findings.
Philadelphia, Pa.: North American Peace Science
Conference. Philadelphia.
Sullivan, M. 1976. International Relations: Theories
and Evidence. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall.
Sullivan, M. 1978. The Causes of War: An Evalua-
tion of the State of Theory. Tucson, Arizona:
Univ. of Arizona, Department of Political
Science.
Urlanis, B. T. 1960. Wars and the Population of
Europe. Moscow, USSR: Government Publishing.
Voevodsky, J. July, 1969. Quantitative behavior of
warring nations. Journal of Psychology, 72:
269-292.
Wallace, M. D. 1973. War and Rank Among Na-
tions. Lexington, Mass.: Heath.
Wallace, M. D. 1973. Alliance polarization, cross-
cutting, and international war, 1815-1964. Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution, 17: 4.
Wallace, M. 1979. The role of arms races in the
escalation of disputes into war: Some new
evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23/1:
3-16.
Wallensteen, P. 1973. Structure and War. Stock-
holm, Sweden: Roben and Sjogren.
Wayman, F. 1981. Bipolarity, multipolarity and the
threat of war. In Power, Pacts, and War, ed. N.N.
Sabrosky. Boulder, Colo: Greenwood Press.
Weede, E. 1970. Conflict behavior of nation states.
Journal of Peace Research, 3: 229-236.
Weede, E. Sept. 1976. Overwhelming preponder-
ance as a pacifying condition among contiguous
Asian dyads, 1950-1969. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 20/3: 395-412.
Weiss, H. K. 1963. Stochastic models for the dura-
tion and magnitude of a deadly quarrel. Opera-
tions Research, 11/1: 101-121.
Wesley, J. P. 1969. Frequency of wars and geo-
graphic opportunity. In Theory & Research on
the Causes of War, ed. D. G. Pruitt, R. C. Snyder.
White, R. K. 1968. Nobody Wanted War. Garden
City, N. Y.: Doubleday.
Wilkenfeld, J. 1973. Domestic and foreign con-
flict. In Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics,
ed. J. Wilkenfeld, pp. 107-123. New York:
McKay.
Wilkinson, D. 1980. Deadly Quarrels. Berkeley,
Calif.: University of California Press.
Wright, Q. 1942. A Study of War, 2 vols. Chicago:
University of Chicago. Revised edition, 1965.
Wright, Q. 1965. The escalation of international
conflicts. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9/4:
434-449.
Zinnes, D. 1980a. Empirical evidence on the out-
break of international violence. In Handbook of
Political Conflict, ed. T. Gurr. New York: Free
Press.
Zinnes, D. 1980 b. ’Three Puzzles in Search of a
Researcher.’ Bloomington, Indiana, mimeo.
